

VIETNAM

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UPI-159

(CIA)

WASHINGTON--J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, D-ARK., DISCLOSED TODAY THAT A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DEPUTY BEING PROSECUTED BY PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU WAS WORKING FOR THE CIA.

FULBRIGHT SAID TRAN NGOC CHAU--CHARGED BY THIEU WITH MAKING ILLEGAL CONTACTS WITH A NORTH VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE AGENT--HAD REPORTED ALL THE CONTACTS TO THE CIA. HE SAID CHAU HAD "MANY CLOSE FRIENDS IN THE AMERICAN OFFICIAL COMMUNITY" AND HAD "DAILY CONTACT" WITH CIA OFFICERS.

FULBRIGHT, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, WORKS CLOSELY WITH THE CIA. THE CLEAR IMPLICATION OF HIS STATEMENT WAS THAT CHAU WAS AN AMERICAN SPY, EVEN THOUGH HE IS A MAJOR

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Comment:



Maury and CSDO have copies.

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These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the Office of Current Intelligence to the attached item from the news services.

## Vietnam-Study Conclusion

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1—Following is the text of the conclusions in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff study on Vietnam, made public today:

The assumptions regarding the present situation in Vietnam and the expected future course of developments in that country, on which U.S. policy is apparently based, seem to rest on far more ambiguous, confusing, and contradictory evidence than pronouncements from Washington and Saigon indicate. The success of present American policy appears to depend on three factors:

1. The progressive Vietnamization of the military effort.
2. The stability and cohesiveness of the Thieu Government.
3. The expectation that the enemy can and will do nothing to inhibit Vietnamization or disrupt the Thieu Government's stability.

### Three Factors Related

There is, of course, an intimate relationship among these three factors. Indeed, it may be said that all must succeed—or, perhaps accurately, that none may fail—if present U.S. objectives in Vietnam are to be realized.

Vietnamization is perhaps the most important factor because the possibility of a continuing, progressive American withdrawal obviously depends upon its success. So does pacification, for the key to its success is security. Thus if Vietnamization fails, the United States cannot withdraw and still claim to have achieved its stated objectives.

The stability and cohesiveness of the Thieu Government is of fundamental importance because there must be an agency through which the process of Vietnamization

can be effected. Furthermore, given the importance which has been attached to the constitutional legitimacy of the Thieu Government, its overthrow would probably plunge South Vietnam into a state of political anarchy and at the same time severely strain public patience in the United States.

### Agonizing Prospects

As for the enemy's intentions and capabilities, the policy of Vietnamization is based on the assumption that the enemy is either willing to permit, or unable to prevent, the phased withdrawal of American combat forces and the progressive assumption of the combat burden by the Vietnamese. Were the North Vietnamese to launch a massive attack at any point in the course of this withdrawal, the United States would be faced with the agonizing prospect of either halting—or even reversing—the process of withdrawal, on the one hand, or being forced, on the other hand, to effect an accelerated, complete withdrawal which would be interpreted at home, and probably abroad, as a military and political defeat.

We believe that the evidence presented in this report leads to the inference that the prospects for a successful outcome of any one of the aforementioned three factors, much less all three, must be regarded as, at best, uncertain. Dilemmas thus seem to lie ahead in Vietnam, as they have throughout our involvement in this war that appears to be not only far from won but far from over.

# WAR-POLICY BASIS IS CALLED DUBIOUS

Report for Senate Unit Isn't  
Sure South Vietnam Can  
Ever Assume Burden

Conclusions of staff study  
will be found on Page 12.

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee made public a report today suggesting that the Nixon Administration's policy of Vietnamization rests on dubious assumptions about the abilities of the Saigon Government and the military intentions of North Vietnam.

The study questioned whether the South Vietnamese Army, once American combat troops are withdrawn, would be capable of withstanding a heavy North Vietnamese attack. Even if Vietnamization—the program of turning the combat burden over to South Vietnam—should succeed, the study maintained, a substantial American involvement would still be required in South Vietnam.

While not directly criticizing Administration policy, the report said the underlying assumptions of the policy "seem to rest on far more ambiguous, confusing and contradictory evidence than pronouncements from Washington and Saigon indicate."

The war, it said, "appears to be not only far from won but far from over."

While the report does not bear a specific committee endorsement, it had an important effect on the views of committee members as they prepared to open hearings on Vietnam this week. In making public the report, which he describes as "sober, dispassionate and revealing," Senator J. W. Fulbright, the committee chairman, said it "has given us some sense of the realities of the continuing American involvement in Vietnam."

that he has drawn from the report, Senator Fulbright said: "I can only hope that, in the future, the decisions we make in Vietnam will be guided by realities and not, as in the past, by well-intentioned hopes or unintentional rationalizations."

## Pair Drafted Report

The 18-page study, an abbreviated, censored version of a longer confidential report submitted to the committee, was drafted by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, two former foreign service officers who are now staff consultants of the committee. They were sent to Vietnam last December by Senator Fulbright, an Arkansas Democrat, to study the progress of pacification, the prospects for turning over more of the war burden to the South Vietnamese, the domestic political situation and the outlook for negotiations.

The central question about turning over more of the fighting to the South Vietnamese, the report observed, is whether the South Vietnamese army could now, or soon, defend against a large North Vietnamese attack.

It said the view of senior United States and Vietnamese

military officers and civilian officials "reflects a strong belief that the North Vietnamese are no longer capable of mounting a sufficiently powerful attack to defeat the South Vietnamese army, at least as long as American firepower and airpower are available."

On the other hand, it said, "there are Vietnamese, American journalists and even United States military officers and officials at middle and lower levels who say that the South Vietnamese army could not now defend the country against a massive North Vietnamese attack, even with United States artillery and air support. A number doubt that the army will ever be able to do so."

The staff report marks a new approach by the committee in its study of Vietnam policy. Long a focal point of congressional opposition to the war in Vietnam, the committee is now shifting from a critical to an analytical approach with the new Administration.

No longer is the committee broadly attacking basic policy as it did during the Johnson Administration. To an extent the committee has been neutralized in its criticism by Mr. Nixon's policy of shifting the combat burden to Saigon and with-

drawing United States troops—a policy that the committee members feel is moving in the right direction.

The question now being raised by the committee are whether this policy is workable and what it means in terms of American disengagement.

The long-delayed hearings on Vietnam will not be on the scale that was contemplated last fall before President Nixon delivered his policy speech on Nov. 3.

## Hearings on Resolution

It will begin with hearings on various Vietnam resolutions introduced during the last session of Congress.

Later in the session, probably in April, the committee plans further hearings on the extent of the American involvement in Vietnam with testimony from officials of various civilian agencies in South Vietnam.

The purpose of the second round of hearings will not be to determine why the United States is in Vietnam and whether it should withdraw, but to find out how the assumption of a greater combat role by the South Vietnamese will affect the United States role in Vietnam.

The staff study is designed to provide a framework for the new set of hearings.

The report noted that the success of present American policy in Vietnam depended upon these related factors:

• A progressively larger military effort by the South Vietnamese.

• The stability and cohesiveness of President Nguyen Van Thieu's government.

• The expectation that the enemy can and will do nothing to inhibit the transfer of a greater combat role to the South Vietnamese or disrupt the Thieu Government's stability.

The report observed that there is "an intimate relationship" among these three factors to the point that "all must succeed—or, perhaps more accurately, that none may fail—if present U.S. objectives in Vietnam are to be realized."

Yet, it said, all the evidence leads at least to "the inference that the prospects for a successful outcome" of any one of the three factors, much less all three, "must be regarded as, at best, uncertain."

Of the three factors, the report observed, the assumption

of a greater combat role by the South Vietnamese is probably the most important "because the possibility of a continuing progressive American withdrawal obviously depends upon its success."

While acknowledging that there has been progress in turning over more of the fighting to the Saigon force, the report said it is "common knowledge that the quality of South Vietnam army units is uneven."

The report also said that the Vietnamese have apparently not been given a timetable for withdrawal of American combat troops and their estimates vary widely on when South Vietnamese troops will be able to take over the combat burden.

One American official, for example, told the Senate investigators that President Thieu wanted the bulk of United States combat forces removed during 1970, but a high Vietnamese official told them the American combat troops should not be withdrawn until "1972 or 1973 and 1974."

## Troop Quality Uneven

The success of the program to make Saigon combat self-sufficient, the report maintained, may well depend upon the actions of the enemy and whether North Vietnam is willing to permit a phased withdrawal of American troops while South Vietnamese forces assume the combat burden.

"It seemed clear to us, however," the report said, "that

one has the slightest idea whether the enemy will attack in force" during the American withdrawal, or wait until American forces are withdrawn before striking or, finally, concentrate on political subversion rather than an intensified military effort.

On the question of pacification, the report said there was general agreement that the so-called Revolutionary Development Program, which seeks to insure the security of rural

areas and develop their economics, "is producing considerable evidence of progress."

However, it said "many Americans in the field believe that, despite statistical progress, the gains in pacification are fragile."

As for the stability of the present Saigon Government, the report said the most frequently heard criticism was that President Thieu was becoming "increasingly autocratic, secretive and isolated."